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There are different views on (in-)predictability and on (non-)cooperation in Russian
foreign policy towards the West, but also on the question about how - that is, through
which theoretical framework - to interpret it. This essay aims at contributing to the debate
around these three issues. Its goal is to demonstrate the expediency of using a neoclassical
realist theoretical perspective, enhanced by the inclusion of such subjective factors as
status/prestige and perceptions. While there are factors in Russian domestic and foreign
policy which give it a certain degree of unpredictability, nevertheless, if it is studied in
a comprehensive way, it turns out to be more consistent and predictable than it at ﬁrst
seems. Even though Russia is often accused of being anti-Western and non-cooperative,
this argument does not hold true: Russian foreign policy is selective and includes both
cooperative and non-cooperative tactics.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
There is much controversy amongWestern scholars and
policy makers about the foreign policy1 of the Russian
Federation (RF). On the one hand, Russian foreign policy is
frequently described as volatile with shifts from coopera-
tion to non-cooperation and – until the recent Russian–
Western “reset” – even to anti-Westernism and a new Coldeva@ifsh.de.
y” means the ofﬁcial
quated with the main
te entity which has
n institutional actor
-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,HanyWar (Bugajski, 2004; Lucas, 2008; McKinnon, 2007; Scholl-
Latour, 2006). According to Legvold, “Russian foreign policy
. has lurched through many different - often radically
different - phases. Swings of this magnitude and velocity
are not a normal feature of a country’s foreign policy”
(Legvold, 2007, 3, 10). Because of these swings some
scholars have even diagnosed Russia as a “borderline
personality” (Arias-King, de Arias, and de La Canal, 2008).
Western policy makers complain about Russia’s unpre-
dictability and irrationality (Miliband, 2008; Truszczynski,
2005; Vika-Freiberga, 2000) and suggest that “Moscow
interprets its interests in the wrong way” (Arbatov, 2007).
By contrast, other scholars ﬁnd both shifts and conti-
nuity (Thorun, 2009; Tsygankov, 2010a) or even a prepon-
derance of continuity. For instance, Richard Pipes argues:
“Despite its reputation for unpredictability, Russia is
a remarkably conservative nation whose mentality and
behavior change slowly, if at all.” (Pipes, 2004, 9). Or
according to Allen Lynch: “. the prevalent view of
contemporary Russian foreign policy as relativelyangUniversity. ProducedanddistributedbyElsevier Limited.All rights reserved.
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alist and anti-Western . often proved far from being the
case.” (Lynch, 2001, 8). Mark Webber ﬁnds continuity “in
favor of cooperative but conditional engagement with the
West,” and, in contrast to those who speak of inconsistency
in Russian conduct, notices “a degree of hesitancy, uncer-
tainty and inconsistency” in the West’s Russia policy
(Webber, 2000, 147 and 148). Russian scholars describe
Russian conduct towards the West in terms of “a simulta-
neous partnership and rivalry” (Shevtsova, 2006, 11),
a “confrontational-integrationist paradigm” (Entin &
Zagorskij, 2008) and “calls for peace combined with
active ‘hostilities’” (Bordachev, 2008) (author’s
translations).
In addition to this discussion on the (un-)predictability/
(dis-)continuity and (non-)cooperation in Russian foreign
policy, there is the question about how to interpret it. Some
scholars argue that Russia acts rationally, in particular, on
the basis of realist balance-of-power calculations (Averre,
2009; Lynch, 2001; Sakwa, 2008). Others present it as
a role player, behaving in accordance with its identity,
norms and self/other perceptions (Feklyunina, 2008;
Fischer, 2004; Neumann, 2008; Splidsboel-Hansen, 2002).
The purpose of this essay is to contribute to this
discussion around Russian foreign policy, by considering
three questions: is Russian foreign policy (in)consistent and
(un)predictable; is it predominantly non-cooperative in
relation to theWest in the realm of European security; and,
ﬁnally, which theoretical framework can make Russian
foreign policy more understandable? The ﬁrst section
explains the expediency of using the neoclassical realist
perspective. The second section presents Russia’s attitude
towards the West as expressed in its main foreign policy
and security concepts. The third section deals with the
changes in “the context of action” in Russian–Western
relations with the focus on the years 2007–2010. In the
fourth section the West is “broken up,” and the focus is on
the patterns of Russia’s engagement with Western
(-dominated) international governmental organizations
(IGOs), relevant in the area of European security: the
European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE).2 The last section draws
conclusions about the three questions, raised in this essay.2. Russian foreign policy through the “Lens” of
neoclassical realism
The current popular trend in the studies of international
relations (IR) is methodological pluralism, for instance, in
the form of “realist constructivism” or “constructivist
realism” (Barkin, 2003; Cupchik, 2001). Scholars ﬁnd
“substantial areas of agreement” between rationalism/
realism and constructivism, and “where genuine differ-
ences exist they are as often complementarities as contra-
dictions” (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, 52).2 The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was
institutionalized into the OSCE by a decision of the Budapest Summit in
December 1994.Neoclassical realism reﬂects this trend of searching for
ways to apply different material/objective but also subjec-
tive explanatory categories, both of an external and an
internal nature. It is an approach to international politics
that stresses that “the scope and ambition of a country’s
foreign policy is driven ﬁrst and foremost by its place in the
international system and speciﬁcally by its relativematerial
power capabilities,” but that also acknowledges the
importance of the “intervening variables at the unit level”
(Rose, 1998, 146). For instance, perceptions, historic
memories, culture and other subjective factors play a role
“in the selection and implementation of foreign policy
responses to the international environment” (Taliaferro,
Lobell and Ripsman, 2009a, 280; see also: Kindermann,
2001; Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009; Meier-Walser,
1994; Siedschlag, 2001a, 2001b).
To remind, one of the main realist assumptions is that
states aim at the provision of security, maintenance/
maximization of power, inﬂuence and sovereignty
(Burchill, 2001; Grieco, 1997). However, classical realists
have also noted that not only material factors (e.g. avail-
ability of natural resources, the state of military-industrial
and socio-economic development, quantity and quality of
armed forces), but also subjective or socio-psychological
ones (e.g. competence of the political elite, national char-
acter, morale) matter (Baumann, Rittberger, & Wagner,
2001, 43). Furthermore, they have noted “that not all
foreign policies have always followed so rational, objec-
tive, and unemotional a course.”, but argued: “Yet
a theory of foreign policy. must for the time being, as it
were, abstract from these irrational elements.”
(Morgenthau, 1993, 7).
Neoclassical realists go a step further: while re-claiming
the importance of material factors as a driving force for
a country’s foreign policy in the anarchical international
system, they have incorporated into their analysis “tradi-
tional” constructivist categories, giving primacy, however,
to interests and international imperatives rather than to
identities. J. Samuel Barkin argues that it is a normal
development. While many realists worked under the
conditions of the Cold War, where military threats had
special importance, today “in situations in which no
imminent military threat exists, as is currently the case
among many of the world’s major powers,” no a priori
reason exists within realist theory to privilege material/
objective factors (Barkin, 2003, 329). Furthermore, subjec-
tive factors have become a part of Realpolitik: “In the
current international system, states need not compete for
military power. But states still contend for status, inﬂu-
ence, and prestige – international pecking order” (Larson &
Shevchenko, 2010, 184; see also: Mastanduno & Kapstein,
1999; Wolf, 2008).
Neoclassical realism can offer important insights into
the issues of shifts and continuity as well as cooperation
and non-cooperation in Russian foreign policy. Realists
claim that while the main interests of a state are “more or
less permanent” and “tend to show little variation over
time,” what can and does change, “if the context of action
changes, are policy preferences” (Freund & Rittberger, 2001,
71). The changes in the context of action are predetermined
by changes in the international power distribution and in
4 It can be accessed on the webpage of the National Security Council
(NSC) of the RF at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/20.html, last
accessed 10 July 2010.
5 Cf. Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report (January 1994), p.6.
6 “Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (1993), Diplo-
maticheskii Vestnik, January, 3–23.
7 Cf. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/25.html, accessed 10 July 2010.
8 Cf. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1.html, accessed 10 July 2010.
9 The text in Russian was published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta, http://
www.ng.ru/politics/2000-04-22/5_doktrina.html, accessed 10 July 2010.
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seen as inimical and anarchical, cooperation can be a policy
preference, if it helps to increase security, inﬂuence and
power capabilities, including economic utilities. In addi-
tion, states will be more inclined to cooperation if their
concerns for international prestige and status are taken
into account by other actors (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010,
184).
At the same time, a state’s behaviour does not have to be
either cooperative or non-cooperative, but rather it is
“adaptive” (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009b, 30). Neo-
classical realism explains that states may view each other
simultaneously as security threats and valuable economic
partners; it is also possible “for irrational national collective
identity politics to coexist with rational self-interest”
(Sterling-Folker, 2002, 103). In other words, “cooperation
and competition cannot be separated;” cooperation “can be
used and often is used to compete” (Doran, 2010, 41).
Finally, a state may act in a compensatory way: “.a
conﬂictual action in one policy area is followed by coop-
erative action vis-à-vis the same government in the same
or another policy area, and the other way around. In this
way, governments try to keep open as many behavioral
options and interaction opportunities as possible” (Faber,
1990, 309).
To sum up, neoclassical realism is chosen as the
theoretical framework for this analysis of Russian foreign
policy, ﬁrst, because of its focus on a state. Second, neo-
classical realism helps to stress the importance of
external imperatives: Russian foreign policy towards the
West predominantly changes together with the West’s
policies towards Russia. The Russian international posi-
tion “has emerged as historically dependent on the
West’s power and recognition” (Tsygankov, 2010b).
Dmitri Trenin notices that in conditions under which the
process of deﬁning national identity has not come to an
end and due to the deﬁcit in long-term visions and
strategies, Russian foreign policy has been reactive, in
that it responds to the policies of the West (Dmitri
Trenin, 2009, 15). According to Thomas Graham, “What
Russia can afford to do in the world arena will, to a large
extent, depend on the ups and downs of other powers
and on the change of their weight in relation to Russia.”
(Graham, 2010, 112, author’s translation). This is why, the
balance-of-power calculations and international impera-
tives “affect broad contours of foreign policy” of the RF
(cf. Rose, 1998, 167). Third, while stressing the impor-
tance of material factors, neoclassical realism helps to
integrate subjective categories, such as status/prestige
and perceptions.
3. Conceptualization of Russian foreign policy in
relation to the West
Even the short comparative overview3 possible within
the framework of this essay, demonstrates that Russia’s
main realist interests have been continuous throughout the3 For more detailed comparative analyses see: De Haas, 2010;
Kassianova, 2001; Sergounin, 1998.process of (re-)conceptualization of its foreign policy
through its main documents – “The Law on Security”
(1992),4 “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine”
(1993),5 Foreign Policy Concept (1993,6 2000,7 2008),
National Security Concept (1997,8 2000), Strategy of the
National Security of the Russian Federation (RF) until 2020
(2009), and Military Doctrine (2000,9 2010).10 These realist
interests proceed from one document to another, despite
domestic changes in Russian leadership (different foreign
ministers and presidents) and despite external changes in
the EU and NATO and in the US government and in their
Russia policies. At the same time, policy preferences or
tactics change, when the context of action changes.
Above all, since its ﬁrst post-Soviet documents, Russia
has proclaimed its readiness to protect its sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity, and security, which
corresponds to a realist understanding of a state’s main
interests (Burchill, 2001; Grieco,1997). Furthermore, Russia
consistently aspires through its foreign policy “to promote
the development of the national economy” – utility maxi-
mization – (“Foreign Policy Concept of the RF,” 2000).
Though Russia has, since the 1990s, aspired to be integrated
into the “world economy and politics,” this goal has not yet
been achieved (Foreign Policy Concept 2008). Economic
modernization has become the slogan of Medvedev’s
presidency (Foreign Policy Concept 2008). The “Program
for Effective Use of Foreign Policy in the Long Term
Development of Russia,” an unofﬁcial Kremlin strategy11
emphasized the need to develop modernization partner-
ships, especially in view of the consequences of the global
ﬁnancial crisis. Russian state leaders realize that the main
security threats are of an internal nature (e.g. poor socio-
economic conditions, environmental threats, threats to
territorial integrity), but it compares its domestic devel-
opment and international capabilities with those of
Western actors (a realist feature). Russia wants to become
economically stronger vis-à-vis theWest, but it realizes that
it can only achieve this goal with Western help.
Furthermore, Russia has aspired to equal great power
status. Most of the documents are optimistic about the
potential for achieving this goal. Medvedev’s national
security strategy (2009), in particular, starts by noting that
“Russia has overcome the consequences of the systemic.
crisis at the end of the 20th century. All in all, the
prerequisites have been established for . the trans-
formation of the RF into one of the leading great powers.”
(author’s translation). The paradox is that this concept10 The remaining documents can be accessed on the Russian MFA
webpage.
11 Cf. the Russian edition of Newsweek on 11 May 2010, at http://www.
runewsweek.ru/country/34184/, accessed 15 May 2010.
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the global ﬁnancial crisis. This shows the need to draw
a line under the crisis of the 1990s and to emphasize Rus-
sia’s achievements for internal mobilization of the pop-
ulation to overcome the economic crisis. According to
neoclassical realism, “leaders almost always face a two-
level game in devising and implementing grand strategy:
on the one hand, they must respond to the external envi-
ronment, but, on the other, they must extract and mobilize
resources from domestic society, work through existing
domestic institutions, and maintain the support of stake-
holders” (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009a, 7).
Another continuity is that most of these foreign policy-
related documents underline the need to transform the
Western-dominated international system into a multilat-
eral one, where Russia can play the role of a great power.
The Foreign Policy Concepts of 1993 and 1997, in particular,
called for creating a new pan-European security architec-
ture on the basis of the CSCE/OSCE. Because this hope
turned out to be futile, the subsequent documents criticize
“the striving of particular states and intergovernmental
associations to belittle the role of existing mechanisms for
ensuring international security, above all the United
Nations and the OSCE” (Security Doctrine 2000) and call for
reforms in the OSCE, so that it can fulﬁll its function “of
being a forum for an equitable dialogue” (Security Concept
2008).
While in 1993 the foreign policy focused on a partner-
ship with the US, since 1997 Russia’s documents have
referredmore negatively to the US and NATO and have paid
more attention to the EU. In 1997, Russia identiﬁed “bloc
politics” by other countries as well as attempts to isolate
Russia, primarily because NATO would not give up its
enlargement plans. After NATO’s 1999 military operation in
the former Yugoslavia, which Russia strongly opposed, it
concluded that “a number of states are stepping up efforts
toweaken Russia” (Security Concept of the RF 2000). Russia
feels excluded from the international decision-making
process, and this affects its foreign policy (Light,
Löwenhardt, & White, 2006). The most recent documents
no longer have such harsh wording, but also speak of
“global competition” with respect to the models of devel-
opment and values, “the incompetency of the existing
global and regional system,” disagreements between major
international actors, and Russian aspirations to equality
(Foreign Policy Concept 2008).
In terms ofmilitary threats, themilitary doctrine of 2010
has caused a lot of astonishment and generated a great deal
of criticism in theWest,12 primarily due to two points: ﬁrst,
because NATO is in ﬁrst place on its list of national security
“dangers,” or, more precisely, attempts to empower NATO
with global functions and to move NATO infrastructures
close to the borders of the RF, including by means of
enlargement, and, second, it emphasizes Russia’s right to
use nuclear weapons, if it or its allies are attacked.
However, the Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine in12 Cf. Interview of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, “We can’t say
that NATO presents a threat to us,” Kommersant, 11 June 2010, in: David
Johnson’s Russia List, 116, 15 June 2010.1993 also mentioned “expansion of military blocks and
alliances to the detriment of the interests of Russia’s mili-
tary security” and “the build-up of forces on the Russian
borders to limits upsetting the existing balance of forces,”
without naming NATO explicitly. In both the 1993 and the
2010 documents it is not NATO per se but rather its
enlargement that is identiﬁed as a danger and it is thereby
warned not to enlarge. If in 1993 this point was in ninth
place on the list of “existing and potential sources of
external military dangers,” in 2010 it is in ﬁrst place.
However, the 2010military doctrine differentiates between
“dangers,” where NATO is mentioned, and “threats,” which
are considered more serious. Despite this overall negative
attitude towards NATO, the doctrine offers many areas for
cooperation with the West (see: Schmidt & Müller, 2010).
As for the second point – Russia’s right to use nuclear
weapons – it had already abandoned the principle of no-
ﬁrst-use of nuclear weapons in 1993 (Basic Provisions
1993).
At the regional level, the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States (CIS) is deﬁned as “a priority area of Russia’s
foreign policy” (Foreign Policy Concept 2008). While in the
1990s Russia rather sporadically pursued its objective of
some integration into the CIS, not knowing which formats
of integration to prioritize, in 2008, Medvedev’s strategy
identiﬁed three regional institutions to be strengthened:
the CIS per se, the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC).
However, questions remain about the attainability of these
goals (Alexandrova, Götz, & Halbach, 2003; Jackson, 2003;
Kobrinskaya, 2004; Lawson & Erickson, 1999; Ofer &
Pomfret, 2004). While its CIS policy has been a tool for
Russia to assert its global power and to become more equal
with the West, it has drawn Russia even further away from
the West.
Summing up, Russia’s foreign policy has been consistent
in pursuing its main realist interests: maximization of
power and security as well as maximization of utilities –
military and economic capabilities – vis-à-vis the West –
but with the help of the West. Russia is also aiming at
maximizing prestige and at receiving Western recognition
as a great power.
On the one hand, Russia wants to be a great power, to
survive in the unfriendly realist world. The majority of
Russian analysts interpret Russian foreign policy from
a realist perspective: each state “little by little is waiting for
the other to become weaker” (Bogaturov, 2010a, author’s
translation).13 Under these conditions, Russia is interested
in strengthening its power and its military and economic
capabilities as well as its ability to exert inﬂuence both
within the international system (for instance, within the
framework of the OSCE but also in relation to NATO’s
decisions), and also at the regional level (CIS): “Strength is
a precondition for dialogue” (Areshev, 2007, 142, author’s
translation). The overall negative role, attributed to NATO
and the US, is not only a sign of the “inertness of mentality”13 See also on the realist vision of the Russian IR scholars: Baranovsky &
Bogaturov, 2010; Bogaturov, 2010b; Sergunin, 2004; Shakleyina, 2003;
Tsygankov, 2005; Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2010.
14 Istanbul Document. Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 1999, pp. 119–235.
15 Istanbul Document. Istanbul Summit Declaration, p. 50.
16 Cf. Joint Statement of the RF and Georgia, Istanbul, 17 November 1999,
point 1, Annex 14 of the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to
the Treaty on CFE, CFE.DOC/2/99.
17 Cf. NATO, Final Communiqué, Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council, 24 May, 2000, Florence.
18 Cf. The draft of the European Security Treaty, 29 November 2009,
available at: http://www.kremlin.ru. See also: Dunay & Herd, 2009,77–98
East-West Institute, 2009; Lo, 2009; Lukyanov, 2009; Monaghan, 2008;
Yurgens, Yu, Dynkin, & Baranovsky, 2009.
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stereotypes, but also of a “pragmatic choice of maintaining
military might” (Trenin, 2003, author’s translation).
On the other hand, this great power objective reﬂects
Russia’s self-perception and its historic memory of being
a great power – the Russian empire – or even the Soviet
superpower: “Our present life would seem to be devoid of
anything visible bearing out the correctness and aptness of
the words ‘Russia is a great power.’ But while these words
may sound surprising, few Russians will fail to perceive
them as natural and their meaning as self-evident”
(Pozdnyakov, 1993, 4). As a result, “Russia wants to be
recognized – not only in word, but also in deed – as a great
power among great powers” (Arbatov, 2007).
This dualism– thedesire to strengthenpowercapabilities
vis-à-vis the West, but seeking its help and recognition –
create preconditions for both cooperation with the West as
well as some balance-of-power opposition and potential for
non-cooperation and even conﬂict. In its foreign policy
concepts Russia proclaims cooperation but also uses warn-
ings to the West, to try to inﬂuence its actions.
One more point worth mentioning is that all these
documents are vague about the meaning of Russia’s great
power role, its goals and the means of realizing them.
Russian leaders do not know what to prioritize: Russia’s
regional role as a leading CIS power or its global role;
Russia’s competition with Western actors in the CIS, or
greater integration with the West; its own autonomy or
greater dependence on theWest, whichwould be the result
of greater integration. This ambivalence, in addition to the
overall lack of transparency in the foreign policy decision-
making process, a tendency to act on a short-term case-
to-case basis, and questions about the tandem relationship
between President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin
and its future, contribute to Russia’s foreign policy being
seen as unpredictable. However, it is fair to say that in the
face of constant changes in domestic and international
conditions and the appearance of new threats, it is also
challenging to deﬁne clear long-term strategies for
Western actors, and their decision-making processes leave
questions open as well. Furthermore, the vagueness of
conceptual documents is often used as a tool in interna-
tional practice, for example, to avoid unnecessary
commitments. In Russia’s case, it is both the incapability of
formulating clear goals and tactical ambiguity.
4. Russian–Western rollercoaster ride and the change
in the “Context of Action”
The previous section has indicated that Russian foreign
policy concepts reﬂect the changes in the context of action.
Many Western policy makers and even analysts are often
taken by surprise with Russian actions, precisely because
they ignore or underestimate these material and subjective
changes. This section looks into these, by considering
several examples from the Russian–Western rollercoaster-
like relationship – with great ups and downs – in 2007–
2010.
To start with the ﬁrst example, in December 2007, the
Western partners were shocked, when the RF showed its
political teeth by suspending its participation in theConventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The CFE
treaty was concluded between two groups of states (the
NATO and the Warsaw Pact), and it no longer corresponds
to the post-ColdWar reality (Dunay, 2004, 259–290; Dunay
& Zellner, 2000, 349–363; Zellner, Schmidt, & Neuneck,
2009). In 1999, at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, OSCE
member states agreed on the adaptation of the CFE treaty.14
At the same time, Russia committed to “complete with-
drawal of the Russian forces from the territory of Moldova
by the end of 2002”15 and to disbanding two of its bases in
Georgia by 1 July 2001.16 When this did not happen, NATO
states saw no “basis” to “work towards bringing the
adapted Treaty into force.”17 According to Russian repre-
sentatives, the CFE Treaty was used as tool of pressure on
Russia by the West, and this was not acceptable (Areshev,
2007). Most outstandingly, in 2007, during the Munich
Conference on Security Policy, the then-President Putin
clearly expressed discontent with the “pitiful condition” of
the CFE Treaty, when “NATO countries openly declared that
they would not ratify this treaty. But . It turns out that
NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we
continue to strictly fulﬁll the treaty obligations and do not
react to these actions at all” (Putin, 2007). In his shocking
speech, he also criticized the international system, in
which: “One state, the United States, has overstepped its
national borders in every way” and “imposes [its policies]
on other nations” (Putin, 2007). Despite the forcefulness of
these statements, NATO countries did not take them seri-
ously. They were used to empty Russian warnings and
threats in the 1990s (e.g. against NATO enlargements or
NATO’s operation in the former Yugoslavia in 1999), which
were not followed by real actions.
In 2008, the Western partners were again taken by
surprise, when President Medvedev made his proposal on
a dialogue on a new European Security Treaty (EST).18 They
did not know how to assess it: positively, as an invitation to
discuss problems in Russian–Western relations or nega-
tively as Russia’s attempt to limit NATO’s activities or even
to get rid of NATO altogether. The RF had developed only
a vague proposal, ﬁrst, because of the inability to develop
a more comprehensive framework, and, second, because
a concrete, well-elaborated treaty would have causedmuch
criticism from Western partners for not including them in
the conceptualization process. Though this proposal
seemed to be something new, it resembled Russia’s earlier
proposals on pan-European security.
Just a few months later, the West was again shocked,
when Russia showed its military teeth in the crisis around
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the decade, in August 2008, Russia achieved victory once
again.. Having defeated Georgia, behind which were the
US and NATO, Russia once again demonstrated the political
ability to resist aggressors in a harsh way. Moreover, Russia
thereby stopped further enlargement of NATO.”
(Karaganov, 2011).
Even though these three events are quite different, they
nevertheless reﬂect the main goals of the RF: revision of
“rules of the game” of the current international system,
fromwhich it feels excluded, a greater inclusion of Russia as
a great power and recognition of this status by the West.
This policy is in line with the major foreign policy and
security concepts of the RF.
This assertive foreign policy was made possible by
improved material domestic capabilities, by the self-
perception of being stronger as well as by the previous
actions of the West, which neglected Russia’s concerns
and generated its negative emotions. First of all, Russia’s
Western partners did not expect that it would be able “to
rise up from its knees” so quickly after the collapse of the
1990s, and that, thanks to its economic growth (due
primarily to high energy export prices and increased
world energy demand, but also to internal reforms), Russia
would acquire the necessary capabilities to pursue a more
assertive and competitive foreign policy. According to
Rose, “The neoclassical realism predicts that an increase in
relative material power will lead eventually to a corre-
sponding expansion in the ambition and scope of a coun-
try’s foreign policy activity” (Rose, 1998, 167). In addition
to Russia’s improved domestic capabilities, the West
needed Russia’s energy exports, but also its cooperation on
such important security issues as Iran, North Korea,
Afghanistan and terrorism, which also added to Russia’s
assertiveness.
Second, even though Russia still had many economic
and military weaknesses vis-à-vis the West, it started to
feel stronger and more self-assured. Domestically the
image of Russia, “showing Kuzkina’s mother” to the West,
as well as the image of the anti-Russian West has served
to strengthen the ruling regime and to distract attention
from difﬁcult socio-economic issues. The majority of the
population sees Russia’s role in the world as that of
a great power.19 Arbatov notes that today none of the
political parties or state institutions are ready to accept
the international position Russia had in the 1990s, when
its interests and opinions were simply ignored (Arbatov,
2010).
Third, throughout the 1990s while Russia was seeking
inclusion and acceptance of the Western countries, it “had
to swallow the war in the Balkans, two rounds of NATO
expansion, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, U.S.
military presence in Central Asia, the invasion of Iraq and
plans to deploy elements of nuclear missile defense in
Eastern Europe” (Tsygankov, 2009, 58). According to19 See: Rossiia v mire: nashi natsionalnye tseli i kak ih dobitsia [Russia in
the World: Our National Goals and How to Achieve Them], WCIOM, 11
November 2008, http://wciom.ru/index.php?id¼268&uid¼10954,
accessed 1 June 2011.Arbatov, theWest missed a “unique opportunity” to engage
Russia more in the political-military and economicWestern
institutions and to contribute to the creation of a new
multilateral order. Instead, the Western powers chose
a different path: “not only did they interfere in the internal
affairs of Russia under the conditions of its deep internal
crisis, the West also rushed to use its foreign policy and
militaryweaknesses, in order to stake out a claim to asmany
advantages as possible, before Russia started to reassert its
national interests” (Arbatov, 2010, author’s translation; see
also Trenin, 2006).
These interconnected changes in the context of action
were overlooked in the West, and “only after a military
conﬂict in Georgia did the West understand that Moscow
was serious and was ready to act” (Arbatov, 2010,
author’s translation). In the words of Lukin, this was “a
justiﬁed - and quite possibly, much overdue - signal that
it did not ﬁnd the post-Soviet foreign policy paradigm
acceptable any longer” (Lukin, 2008). According to Kar-
aganov: “.I repeatedly asked Western experts: ‘Do you
not understand that this large country with a great
history will revive and will never agree to NATO expan-
sion to its historical territories?’ My interlocutors quietly
agreed or looked away in the vain hope that the ‘moment
of truth’ would never come and that the great country
would never think of its interests again” (Karaganov,
2009).
Through its military actions in Georgia and the
following recognition of the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, Russia solidiﬁed the status quo, and this was
also a step to prevent further NATO enlargement (Allison,
2009; Averre, 2009). Even though it is also possible to
argue that this step was irrational and illogical because it
could have led to bigger problems in Russian–Western
relations, Russia’s greater isolation and the reduction of
economic cooperation with the West, neoclassical realism
warns that foreign policy steps, such as this one, do not
have to be due to “irrationality, stupidity, or lack of fore-
sight, since the policy-makers involved are often acutely
aware that the decisions made will have negative conse-
quences elsewhere” (Sterling-Folker, 2002, 126). Russian
political experts stressed that Russia’s actions were painful,
but necessary.20
There are signs that the Georgian crisis has made
Western partners more attentive to Russia’s concerns.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy recognized “that Russia
may have felt neglected by Western countries that no
longer saw it as an equal partner, to the point that Russia
may have believed that only a relationship of force would
ensure that it was respected” (Sarkozy, 2008). Or as the US
Secretary of State admitted, the previous US administration
took “a rather confrontational approach toward Russia”
(Clinton 2009). Obama’s administration aims to “reset”
Russia-US relations. NATO’s Secretary General Rasmussen
recognized that a new missile defense system should
include “not just all countries of NATO but Russia too.”2120 Author’s interviews with political analysts, Moscow, October 2010.
21 RFE/RL (2010), NATO urges Russia to help create ‘Security Roof’, 27
March.
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ship Action Plan,22 and NATO and Russia reafﬁrmed their
partnership at the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010. The Corfu
Process was launched within the OSCE with the goal of
reloading the dialogue on “the current challenges and
future perspectives” in the area of joint European security
and “restoring conﬁdence and trust among all stake-
holders.”23 A “fast-forward”24 has begun in EU-Russia
relations, and talks on a new EU-Russia agreement that
would replace the PCA have restarted. However, questions
remain on how to implement these declarations in practice,
as many objective and psychological problems remain.
Summing up, the changes in the context of action at
different levels – domestic material capabilities, domestic
subjective self-perception and Western actions – have
made Russian foreign policy more assertive in pursuing
security, autonomy and maximization of status/prestige.
While “Russia’s aspiration to regain its positions in the
international arena were often perceived. as an anomaly,
as an expression of Russia’s ‘traditional animosity towards
the West and its values,’ as a relapse into imperialism and
a mentality in the spirit of the Cold War” (Arbatov, 2010,
author’s translation), this new assertiveness, nevertheless,
“does not imply confrontational behavior and does not
mean that Russians have acquired a taste for hegemony to
replace multilateralism” (Tsygankov, 2009, 59). On the
contrary, this rollercoaster ride-like development in
Russian–Western relations in 2007–2010 demonstrates the
co-existence of both cooperative (EST initiative) and non-
cooperative (suspension of the CFE treaty and develop-
ments around Georgia) approaches in Russian foreign
policy. As was the case with the CFE treaty, many of Russia’s
non-cooperative actions are actually responses to the
West’s lack of cooperation and readiness to integrate Russia
more closely into its security frameworks.
5. Russian–Western relations at the level of
institutions
Even if we treat theWest as a generalized actor, as in the
earlier parts of this essay, an overview of Russian foreign
policy over several years, shows that Russian foreign policy
has not been anti-Western. This section reviews Russia’s
policy in relation to the West, by breaking the West up into
three security institutions – the CSCE/OSCE, the EU and
NATO. This underlines the compensatory character of
Russian foreign policy, its general Realpolitik-continuity,
but also changes in policy preferences which reﬂect the
aforementioned changes in the context of action.
Starting with the CSCE/OSCE, Russia’s attitude, as
mentioned above, changed from hope to disillusionment
and even a desire to downplay the importance of the
organization. Early in the 1990s, Russia associated the CSCE22 Cf. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign
Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Final communiqué, Press
Release: (2008) 153.
23 Corfu Informal Meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers on the Future of
European Security. Chair’s Concluding Statement to the Press, 28 June
2009, at: http://www.osce.org, accessed 10 July 2010.
24 EU President Herman Van Rompuy, cited in: Aris, 2010.with a great number of tasks, the fulﬁlment of which could
have helped Russia to reafﬁrm its great power position, but
they exceeded the real capabilities of the CSCE (Zagorskiy,
1997, 518). Gradually realizing that its dream of a pan-
European organization in the form of a transformed
CSCE/OSCE would not come true, Russia “transformed from
one of the major pillars of the OSCE into its most vocal
critic” (Gerrits, 2008, 107). It “has lost most of its sense of
ownership in the OSCE” (Zellner, 2005, 389). On many
occasions the OSCE became a “hostage in an ongoing
political battle” between Russia and the West (Nikonov,
2003, 23). As a result, today Russia sees the OSCE as
a Western IGO, trying to diminish the great power position
to which it aspires.
After its disillusionment with the CSCE/OSCE, Russia
supported the European Security and Defense Policy
(ESDP), hoping that it would replace NATO (Danilov, 2005).
Nevertheless, Russia-EU relations in the security area
remained “in the embryonic stage” (Ivanov, cited in:
Fridman & Haass, 2005). One more problematic and
controversial issue was that of EU enlargements. Russia
presented its concerns to the EU, while concurrently hop-
ing that the EU enlargement would replace the NATO
enlargement (Arbatova, 2005, 133). After the EU enlarge-
ment in 2004 Russia started seeing the EU as divided into
the “old” Russia-friendly versus the “new” US-friendly and
anti-Russian EU (Schmidt-Felzmann, 2008; Sevtsova,
2007). With the EU’s greater focus on its and Russia’s
common neighbourhood, “[t]he Union’s well-meant insis-
tence on common values . is seen as . basically
demanding Moscow’s capitulation in the face of Europe”
(Haukkala, 2005, 9). Russia distrusts the EU (Tumanov,
Gasparishvili, & Romanova, 2011). Despite problems
between Russia and the EU, their economic cooperation has
been strong and the focus is on the Partnership for
Modernization.25
Coming to NATO, the variety of activities and documents
on cooperation is striking. However, if the effort and time
invested and the real results are compared, then the overall
conclusion on Russia-NATO cooperation is hardly satisfying
(Adomeit & Kupferschmidt, 2008). Furthermore, “cooper-
ation exists until a point is reached where either side -
mostly Russia - ﬁnds it difﬁcult to invest in further
exchange. Unforeseen events . continue to shape NATO-
Russia interaction much more than any efforts aimed at
institutionalizing the relationship” (Steinel, 2008, 126).
Russia has, on many occasions, faced a dilemma of either
refusing to cooperate and being sidelined, or participating
but on NATO’s terms (Headley, 2008, 327).
Generally speaking, while Russia has aspired to greater
inclusion and cooperation, its relations with these three
Western IGOs have developed, at least until the recent
“reset,” from more positive interests, hopes and optimism
towards more negative “aversive” interests, disappoint-
ment and the desire to prevent Russia’s further exclusion
and marginalization of its role in European or even global25 Cf. Joint Statement on the Partnership for Modernization, EU-Russia
Summit 31 May–1 June 2010, Rostov-on-Don, 1 June 2010, Document
10546/10 PRESSE 154.
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nent, even within the framework of the OSCE, and
competition is developing between Russia, one the one
hand, and the EU and NATO, on the other hand, in the CIS
area. While competition can be positive and lead to new
constructive ideas and policies if there is a common polit-
ical platform, the competition between Russia and the
West is rather of a negative character, undermining each
other policies (see: Tyler 2008, 107; Dovidio et al. 2008).
Nevertheless, if we look at Russia’s tactics vis-à-vis the
three IGOs over the same periods, we will also see that its
tactics have been selective – a combination of cooperative
and non-cooperative steps. For instance, in 1992, Russian
Foreign Minister Kozyrev declared, within the framework
of the CSCE, that Russian foreign policy was being “amen-
ded” to recognize that “traditions based in Asia” limited
“rapprochement with Europe,” that the territory of the
former Soviet Union was “at bottom a post-imperial
expanse” where Russia expected to establish its interests
using all possible means (Hurlburt, 1995). In the second
part of his speech he explained that this was just a dramatic
rhetorical tactic to warn theWest, especially NATO, of what
might happen, if NATO continued to deliberate on its
enlargement, and if Russia’s interests were not taken more
seriously (Hurlburt, 1995). While Russia used the CSCE as
a platform to proclaim its dissatisfaction with NATO poli-
cies, its NATO relations per se developed quite positively,
and the same year Russia became a member of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council. During this period, the EU
and Russia were negotiating the Partnership and Cooper-
ation Agreement (PCA) provisions. At the same time, Russia
was negative about the Maastricht Treaty and the Peters-
berg tasks, which envisaged military deployments outside
the EU.
During the ﬁrst Chechen campaign in 1994–1996, there
were again quite mixed developments: Russia joined the
Partnership for Peace, but criticized NATO’s enlargement
plans and the 1995 airstrikes in the former Yugoslavia.
Nevertheless, it joined the Implementation Force in January
1996 (Smith, 2008, 3). Russia became more critical of the
CSCE/OSCE, but agreed to the OSCE Assistance Group (AG)
to Chechnya and the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Only after Russia agreed to the OSCE AG, did the EU
renew its process of ratifying the PCA with Russia, which
had been stopped to express the EU’s criticism of the war
and human rights violations by Russian troops in Chechnya.
In 1999 – one of the most difﬁcult years for Russian–
Western relations (NATO enlargement, the second military
campaign in Chechnya, the military operation of NATO in
Kosovo) – Russia “froze” its cooperation with the Alliance
from March to July after NATO operation began. Simulta-
neously, Russia-EU relations developed positively, and new
strategic documents were adopted: the “Common Strategy
of the European Union on Russia”26 and “Russia’s Middle
Term Strategy towards the EU (2000–2010).”27 Moreover,26 It is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.
htm#an2, accessed 12 June 2010.
27 It is available at: http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_245.htm,
accessed 12 June 2010.as mentioned, at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November,
Russia agreed to a number of challenging concessions.
Like 1999, 2008 was also dramatic: Kosovo’s declaration
of independence, its recognition by many Western states
and Russia’s opposition; Medvedev’s proposal on the EST;
the crisis around South Ossetia. In response to Russia’s
military operation in Georgia, NATO “froze” cooperation
with Russia within the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Meet-
ings and the EU “froze” negotiations with Russia on the
new PCA. However, as early as November 2008 the EU
resumed PCA negotiations with Russia, and NATOmembers
agreed to restart NRC meetings in March 2009. Despite
problems in NATO-Russia relations in 2008, they continued
to cooperate on such important issues as Afghanistan and
a “well-known triad: international terrorism, nuclear non-
proliferation and the energy dialogue” (Shevtsova, 2006,
12). Border security, migration, trafﬁcking, soft security
issues, and economic and environmental dimensions also
numbered among unproblematic issues.
Summing up, Russia has an instrumental approach
towardsWestern IGOs. Its speciﬁc goals towards each of the
IGOs are different, depending on the nature of the organi-
zation, from political-military through soft security to
economic goals. However, Russia’s overarching main stra-
tegic interest that it pursues within the framework of all
three Western IGOs is to be somehow involved in the
decision-making processes and/or that its concerns not be
ignored. Furthermore, it aspires to recognition as a great
power. The overall disappointment in Russia (which is also
seen in Russian strategic foreign policy concepts) is because
this goal of “inclusion” and “equality” has not been reached.
Because of other powerful actors within the IGOs, Russia is
frequently unable to instrumentalize them.
6. Conclusion
This essay has considered three questions around
Russian foreign policy: whether it is (in-)consistent and
(un-)predictable, whether it is cooperative or non-
cooperative in relationship to the West and, ﬁnally, what
theoretical perspectives can help in understanding Russian
policy. The essay looked at Russian foreign policy at its
conceptual level, by giving an overview of the main foreign
policy and security concepts; it analyzed Russian foreign
policy over a number of years; it considered Russia’s atti-
tude and interests towards the West as a generalized actor,
but also by “breaking up” the West into three IGOs. This
approach has helped to achieve a more diversiﬁed look at
Russian foreign policy.
To start with the ﬁrst question, Russian foreign policy is
more predictable and more consistent. To understand it,
both the domestic context of action – material power
capabilities, subjective self-perception and perception of
international realities – as well as objective changes in the
international context, that is the actions of the West, have
to be taken into account. Even though there are some
features of vagueness in Russian policy (e.g. non-
transparent decision-making process, lack of long-term
strategic vision and inability to formulate concrete strate-
gies), nevertheless, Western politicians and even some
analysts have often failed to recognize the clear signals that
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realism helps in understanding that Russia is pursuing
more or less permanent interests throughout different
phases of its post-Soviet foreign policy. These include
provision of security and autonomy, maximization of
material utilities, but also maximization of status/prestige.
Shifts at the level of policy preferences depend on the
changes in the context of action. Improved domestic power
capabilities together with more self-conﬁdence and
restored pride lead to a more assertive foreign policy.
Because Russia’s security and status concerns have largely
been ignored by the West, this has led to a decline in
cooperation and trust. By contrast, greater respect for
Russia’s concerns in the course of a “reset” has led to its
greater readiness to cooperate.
It is especially this last factor of prestige/status that has
not been paid enough attention to. Even if there are
domestic weaknesses, Russia feels self-assured, and this
subjective self-conﬁdence adds to its improved material
power capabilities, making Russia more able to take risky
and self-assertive steps. While Russia oftenmakesmistakes
that lead it further from its Western partners (e.g. the war
in Chechnya, violation of human rights, autocratic
tendencies, problems with the rule of law), the Western
states have to recognize that: “Inclusion into higher-status
groups may be a wiser strategy in the long run than con-
tainment. It is best to co-opt a state into the ‘family of
nations’ early in the process, before the challenger turns to
military competition, out of frustration, as the only avail-
able means of improving its relative position” (Larson &
Shevchenko, 2010, 192). Furthermore, treating Russia’s
status concerns “seriously and respectfully” and according
it a positive identity leads to “major progress in securing its
cooperation” (Larson & Shevchenko, 2010, 206).
While Russian foreign policy has often been seen to be
anti-Western, even without considering the recent
Russian–Western “reset,” this assumption does not hold
true. First, there is a dualism in Russian foreign policy:
while trying to strengthen its power capabilities vis-à-vis
the West, it also looks for the West’s recognition of its
status. While considering some Western actions, such as
NATO enlargements, as a security risk, Russia is interested
in cooperation in other areas of security, such as Afghani-
stan, and modernization of its military equipment, but also
in modernization partnerships with Western countries in
the economic sphere. This is why Russian foreign policy is
compensatory and cooperation and non-cooperation
coexist. This co-existence can be found in different
periods and in Russia’s policy towards different IGOs.
Russia instrumentalizes different multilateral and bilateral
frameworks while pursuing its interests. Second, domestic
anti-Western rhetoric is often at variance with Russia’s
actual politics, through which Russia tries to present itself
as a well-behaved, friendly international actor which is,
however, aware of its own interests. This dualism of foreign
policy, being played at the domestic level for a domestic
audience and at the international level for an international
one, is also highlighted by neoclassical realism. Third, while
interpreting Russia’s new assertiveness as anti-Western,
the Western partners often forget that foreign policy is
connected to domestic issues, and stronger capabilities arealso needed to enable Russia to resist the internal and
transnational security challenges this country is facing.
Finally, there is also the role of the West in Russia’s new
assertiveness.
Thus, as far as the third question raised in this article is
concerned, neoclassical realism is an expedient theoretical
framework for studying Russian foreign policy. It helps in
understanding the sources of new assertiveness in Russian
foreign policy, which is based on improved domestic
capabilities. Neoclassical realism pays special attention to
the international context of action, and Russian foreign
policy strongly depends on what the West does. Finally,
neoclassical realism also integrates subjective factors into
the analytical framework. In the future, this perspective
could be further expanded to include more research on
psychological issues, such as status/prestige, but also
emotions, while still maintaining the predominant impor-
tance of an international balance of power and domestic
power capabilities.Acknowledgements
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